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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

KEENE CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
R. W. TAYLOR STEEL
COMPANY, a corporation,
RALPH w. TAYLOR and
LOU JEAN M. TAYLOR,

Case No. 15787

Defendants and
Appellants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action based upon contract seeking the recovery of the purchase price of goods sold to Grating, Inc.,
plus attorneys' fees and interest under trade account guarantees between the plaintiff-respondent Keene Corporation
(hereinafter "Keene") and defendant-appellants R. W. Taylor
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Steel Company, Ralph W. Taylor and Lou Jean M. Taylor (her•
inafter "Taylors").
STATEMEl~T OF FACTS AND
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

In 1965, Grating, Inc. was organized for the

purpo~~

marketing, distributing and fabricating steel grating prod·
ucts including steel bar grating by Ralph
President and Chief Executive Officer.

w.

Taylor, its

At this time,

Grating Inc. entered into an agreement with Keene to
a distributor of its grating products.

beco~

As a result, Grating,

Inc. began and continued to purchase substantially all of
its steel grating from Keene and continued to do so up until
April 18, 1975.
On April 26, 1973 R. W. Taylor Steel, Ralph

w.

TaylM

and Lou Jean M. Taylor entered into two agreements with

K~•

guaranteeing Grating, Inc.'s trade account with Keene.
Throughout the period of time Grating, Inc.

purchas~

its grating from Keene and particularly in the later part of
1974 and early 1975 Keene represented to Grating, Inc. that
Grating, Inc. was purchasing steel grating from Keene at
prices as low or lower than available from competing
manufacturers.
In late 1974 and early 1975 Grating, Inc. discovered
that, contrary to Keene's representations Keene, had been
selling grating to Grating, Inc. at prices well above prices
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at which other manufacturers were selling the same products
to Grating, Inc. 's competitors.
As a result of this discovery as well as other facts
which are set forth in the Preliminary Statement Concerning
Grating, Inc.'s Federal AntiTrust Claims on pages 8 and 9
of this brief, Grating terminated its relationship with

;y£· filed

Keene and on ~___la
_____
,/,..____

suit in the United States

District Court, District of Utah, Northern Division (Grating,
Inc. v. Keene Corporation and Harsco, NC-75-21) alleging
that Keene and a competing manufacturer by the name ofHarsco had violated the federal antitrust laws in their
dealings with Grating, Inc.
Between

Mczrcn 3_1,~_and ~ating

received deliveries of steel grating with a total purchase
price of $66,674.16.
Because Grating, Inc. felt that it had been overcharged
by

Keene on these purchases as well as many prior purchases

that had been paid for in full resulting in damages to
Grating well in excess of $66,674.16, Grating did not pay
for these shipments.
Keene filed a counterclaim against Grating, Inc. in the
federal antitrust action for the amounts of the unpaid
deliveries and on July 31, 1975 filed this action against
the Taylors as trade account guarantors of Grating, Inc.

In
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their answer to Keene's Complaint in this action the Taylors
set forth several affirmative defenses, including defenses
that the contracts for purchase of these unpaid

deliveri~

were illegal in that they are in violation of federal
antitrust laws and were therefore unenforceable and further
that Keene breached its contract with Grating, Inc. in

~~

a condition to the contract of sale was that Grating, Inc.
would be charged no more than that charged by competing
manufacturers for similar goods and that Grating, Inc. has a
valid set-off exceeding the amount claimed by Keene.
On October 4,
For Trial.

.1~76

Keene filed a Notice of

(Record, p. 77).

Readine~

In response the Taylors filed

a Motion to Stay the Proceedings until resolution of the
federal anti-trust action.

(Record, p. 78).

On December 30, 1976 the court ruled that the action
would proceed to trial on all issues except the defenses
based upon violations of federal antitrust laws.

(Record,

pp. 11 0-111 ) •
On February 17, 1977 Keene filed a motion for Summary
Judgment on the ground that as a matter of law antitrust
violations may not be asserted as a defense to a contract
action.

(Record, pp. 128-129).

On June 28, 1977 the court ordered that its previous
order staying a determination of the defenses based on
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antitrust violation would be vacated and ordered that a
pretrial conference be held at which time Keene's Motion for
summary Judgment would be heard.

(Record, pp. 161-162).

On October 25, 1977 the court, after the pre-trial
hearing, ordered that Taylors' defense based on violation of
federal antitrust laws be stricken on the ground that they
are not available as a matter of law and that the case
proceed to trial on the issues of whether a condition of the
contract was that Grating, Inc. would not be charged more
than that charged other customers of Keene and whether
Grating, Inc. would not be charged more than that charged
by competing manufacturers.

(Record, pp. 164-166).

On November 10, 1977 the court entered a further order
granting Partial Summary Judgment in the amount of $40,000.00
in favor of Keene, representing the agreed reasonable value
of the goods sold to Grating, Inc. and dismissed the defense
that Grating, Inc. would be charged no more than other
customers of Keene.
The court further ordered that the case should proceed
to trial on the single issue of whether Grating, Inc. was
entitled to deduction because of the defense that a condition of the contract was that Grating, Inc. would not be
charged more than that charged by other manufacturers of
similar goods.

(Record, pp. 185-188).
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A non-jury trial of this action was held on November 2!
and 30, 1977.
On January 13, 1978 the court filed a Memorandum
Opinion in which the court concluded Keene had in fact
represented and assured Grating that it was receiving a
"competitive price" but these misrepresentations were a
breach of a moral obligation and not a legal obligation.
The court concluded that the law of sales and the statutes
involved would not prevent Keene from benefiting from breach
of moral trust.

The court invited the plaintiff to

prepa~

findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with
opinion.

~~

(Record, pp. 189-192).

On January 24, 1978 Findings of Fact and

Conclusions~

Law and a Judgment in the amount of $66,674.16 together witl
prejudgment interest in the amount of $10,334.47 and post
judgment interest at eight percent was entered.

(Record,

pp. 223-225).
On January 26, 1978 Keene filed a Motion for Costs i~
eluding a reasonable attorney's fee.

(Record, pp. 198-199),

On January 27, 1978 the Taylors filed an

Objection~

Keene's Memorandum of Costs together with a Motion to Have
the Costs Taxed by the Court.

(Record, p. 205).

On February 3, 1978 the Taylors filed a Motion to Alt 11

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered-6by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

or Amend Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

(Record, p. 208).
On March 17, 1978 a Judgment was entered awarding Keene

attorneys' fees in the sum of $14,501.16 and costs in the
amount of $334.10 together with interest at the rate of
eight percent per annum.

(Record, pp.245-246).

Additionally

the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relating to the
Judgment for attorneys' fees was entered on March 17, 1978
(Record pp. 242-244) together with an Order denying Taylors'
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

(Record, pp. 237-238).

On April 17, 1978 the Taylors filed an Amended Notice
of Appeal appealing from the court's Order dated October 25,
1977, the Order in Partial Summary Judgment dated November
10, 1977, the Judgments and Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law dated January 24, 1978 and March 17, 1978 and the
Order dated March 17, 1978.

(Record, p. 248).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the court's Order of
October 25, 1977 striking the defenses based upon antitrust
violations; a reversal of the Judgment together with Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated January 24, 1978; a
reversal of the Judgment together with Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law dated March 17, 1978 and a reversal of
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the Order dated March 17, 1978.
Further the appellant seeks an order remanding the case
to the district court with instructions to stay all proceedings including any proceedings to collect the Partial
Summary Judgment for $40,000 until the completion of the
federal antitrust action.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT CONCERNING
PENDING FEDERAL ANTITRUST CLAIMS
The critical issues raised by this appeal result from
the pendancy of an antitrust action in the Federal District
Court for the District of Utah, Northern Division, entitled
Grating, Inc. v. Keene Corporation and Harsco, NC-75-21.
Due to its relevance in determining these issues a
brief explanation of Grating, Inc.' s claims against Keene in
the federal action is warranted.
As previously stated, in 1965 Grating, Inc. became a
distributor of grating products for Keene and has

purchas~

substantially all of its grating from Keene from 1965 to
April, 1975.

Commencing in approximately 1971 and

contin~

ing until Grating, Inc. ceased dealing with Keene in April,
1975, Keene required Grating, Inc. to resell the grating
products purchased from Keene to its customers at prices
fixed by Keene and a competing manufacturer by the name of
Harsco.
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Commencing in late 1973, after the Taylors had entered
into the trade account Guarantee Agreements with Keene,
Keene began a series of price hikes, raising the prices at
which Grating, Inc. was purchasing the grating products from
Keene to levels well above the prices competing manufacturers
were selling the same products to Grating's competitors.
At the same time Keene assured Grating that it was
receiving a "competitive price".
In the federal action Grating has alleged that these
price increases were an integral part of a scheme whereby
Keene and Harsco fixed the price at which its agents and
distributors, including Grating, Inc. could resell their
product thus dividing the market.

Then Keene increased the

price at which Grating, Inc. would buy the products from
Keene.

The purpose of this scheme was to insure that

Grating, Inc. would keep its relative share of the market
but also insure that the profits would be passed onto Keene.
Additionally Grating, Inc. has alleged that Keene
prevented Grating from purchasing grating from other manufacturers by conspiring with other manufacturers or suppliers to either not sell to Grating or to sell at prices at
~higher

than Keene's price to Grating, Inc.

As a result of these violations Grating, Inc. is
claiming damages to its business in excess of One Million
Dollars.
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POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A
MATTER OF LAW THAT ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS
CAN NEVER BE A PROPER DEFENSE IN A CONTRACT ACTION.
15

u.s.c.

S1 states that "Every contract ••• in

restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."

Similarly,

Utah Code Annotated S50-1-1 (1953, as amended) provides that
"Any combination by persons having for its object or effort
the controlling of the prices of ••• any article of manufac·
ture or commerce ••• is prohibited and unlawful."

And,

Section 50-1-6 of the Utah Code declares that "Any contract
or agreement in violation of any provision of this chapter
shall be absolutely void."

(Emphasis added).

During the entire course of this action there has
been an antitrust action pending in the U.S. District Court
of Utah, Northern Division, entitled Grating, Inc. v. KeeM
Corporation and Harsco, Civil No. NC-75-21, filed April U,
1975.

The appellants in the present appeal are the plain-

tiffs in the federal antitrust action, and are alleging

~

that action that Keene Corporation is guilty of a price
fixing scheme which greatly raised the price at which
appellant could purchase grating.

If this allegation is

found to be correct, then the contracts under considerati~
in this case would be illegal, void and of no effect since
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they made up part of the alleged inflated price umbrella.
However, this defense of illegality and antitrust
violation was stricken by the lower court in its Order
of October 25, 1977:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment insofar as it seeks
to have stricken any defense or set off including
the First, Second and Fourth Affirmative Defenses
in the Answer based in whole or in part on the
antitrust laws of the United States is granted on
the ground that such defenses are not available to
defendants as a matter of law. (Record, p. 165).
Ruling as a matter of law that an antitrust violation is not
available as a defense was totally improper.
A.

Antitrust Violations Have Been Allowed
As Defenses To Contract Actions.

Although it is concededly true that "As a defense to an
action based on contract, the plea of illegality based on
violation of the Sherman Act has not met with much favor,"
Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 518 (1959), there have been
cases which have held the defense to be perfectly valid.
The reason so much confusion exists as to whether the
defense should be allowed in a contract action was stated by
one commentator:

"Though a rose is always a rose, contracts

are of different types, and antitrust violations take many
forms."

Sobel, Antitrust Defenses to Contract Actions:

~estion

of Policy Priorities, 16 Antitrust Bull. 455 at

A

456 ( 19 71 ) •

-11-
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Keene Corporation, in its Memorandum in Support of Its
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed February 17, 1977 (Record,
pp. 120-127), cites a number of U.S. Supreme Court cases
which have not allowed the defense of antitrust violation
a contract action.

~

However, since all contracts and all

antitrust violations are somewhat different, the cases
cited by Keene and presumably relied upon by the lower
court should be examined to see if they are controlling in
the present case.
It would seem obvious that in order for an antitrust
violation to be allowed as a contract defense, there should
first be a violation.

Yet in many of the cases relied upon,

the court held that there was not a clear violation of the
antitrust laws:

A. B. Small Co. v. Lamborn & Co., 267

u.s.

248 (1925): D.R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products Refining
Co., 236 U.S. 165 (1915): Dickstein v. Dupont, 443 F.2d 783
(1st Cir. 1971).

Two of the cases relied upon involved

violation of the Robinson-Patman Act which the court has
made clear will never be a defense to contract actions:
Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743
(1947): Exxon Corp. v. Time Industries, Inc., 1974-1 Trade
Cases, '74,926 at 96,146 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
In a couple of the cases cited by Keene in its memorandum, the contracts in question were held to be clearly
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collateral to, and quite distinct from, the alleged antitrust violations.

In these cases the court enforced the

contract to prevent the unjust enrichment of allowing a
person to receive another's property without making payment
therefore.

Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959); Connolly

v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902).
There have been cases, however, with remarkably similar fact situations to the case under appeal here, in which
the defense has been upheld.

See Continental Wall Paper

Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227 (1909); Marathon
Oil Co. v. Hadley, 197 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
In the Continental Wall Paper case, the plaintiff and
defendant entered into an agreement whereby the defendant
wall paper distributor was to purchase all of its requirements from the plaintiff for a price to be established by
the plaintiff.

The plaintiff was part of a combination

which had been raising the price of wall paper in violation
of the antitrust laws.

The plaintiff delivered wall paper

to defendant who refused to pay the inflated price demanded
by the plaintiff.

In an action for the price of goods sold and delivered,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the defendant could validly
raise the defense of antitrust violation, which would
Prevent the plaintiff from recovering the fixed and exces-

-13-
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j

sive price.

In so holding the majority declared that a

court should not:
••• lend its aid, in any way, to a party seeking
to realize the fruits of an agreement that appears tainted with illegality, although the result of applying that rule may sometimes be to
shield one who has got something for which as
between man and man he ought perhaps, to pay •••
212 u.s. at 262.
The Marathon Oil Co. case, supra, was an action against
the guarantors of an oral trade account whereby the buyer
was to purchase gas and oil exclusively from the plaintiff
seller and re-sell the product at prices fixed by the
plaintiff.

The court held that the contract violated the

state antitrust laws and was thus illegal and void.

The

court further held that the plaintiff seller could not
recover the price of goods sold and delivered from the
guarantors when the primary agreement violated the antitrust
laws:

wThe contract of Mrs. L. M. Hadley to guarantee

t~

payment for purchases thereafter to be made by J. Hall
Hadley was tainted with the same vice of illegality as

~~

inuring in the original contract with J. Hall Hadley.•

101

s.w. 2d at 886.
These cases show that under the proper circumstancesa
defense of antitrust violation is totally proper in a cor
tract action.

In the case E. Bement & Sons v. National

Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902), the U.S. Supreme Court
stated:

w[A]nyone sued upon a contract may set up as a
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defense that it is a violation of the act of Congress [Antitrust laws], and, if found to be so, the fact will constitute a good defense to the action."
B.

Id. at 88.

It Would Be Consistent With Public Policy
To Allow The Defense In This Case For Any
Alleged Liability Greater Than The Fair
Market Value Of The Goods Sold And Delivered.

On October 31, 1977, the lower court heard argument on
Keene's Motion for Summary Judgment, and granted Keene
Partial Summary Judgment in the amount of $40,000, the
undisputed fair market value of the grating sold and delivered.

(Record, p. 172).

After granting the partial summary

judgment, the lower court should have ordered the action for
the balance of the alleged $67,674.16 stayed pending the
resolution of the federal antitrust action.

This would

have been consistent with the policies of preventing unjust
enrichment and not having a court enforce illegal agreements.
A recent Law Review note outlined the two basic policy
considerations involved with determining whether an antitrust
violation should be a defense to a contract action as:
1.
Whether either of the parties would be unjustly enriched by upholding or dismissing the
defense; and

2.
Whether dismissal of the defense would make
the court a party to the illegality. Note, Antitrust Violation as a Defense to Breach of Contract:
An Expanded Policy Analysis, 30 U. of Miami L. Rev.
1053 at 1055 (1976).
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In the present case, neither of the parties would have
been unjustly enriched by upholding the defense after the
partial summary judgment was entered for $40,000, and
staying the action pending a resolution of the antitrust
claims.

All of the cases which have denied the defense

in holding or dicta have been concerned with the balancing
problem explained by Justice Holmes' dissent in the Continental Wall Paper case, supra:
••• the policy of not furthering the purposes
of the trust is less important than the policy
of preventing people from getting other people's
property for nothing when they purport to be
buying it. 212· U.S. at 270-271.
Thus, in decidi"hg whether or not the defense of antitrust violation should be allowed in any particular case,
a court should balance the policy of not judicially

furthe~

ing the purposes of the illegal trust or combination, and
the policy of preventing unjust enrichment.

Applying this

balancing standard to the present case, it becomes clear
that after the partial summary judgment there was no possibility of unjust enrichment--Keene Corporation received
judgment for the value of the goods sold and delivered to
Grating, Inc.

At that point the policy of not allowing the

courts to further the purposes of unlawful trusts should
have become of dominant concern, and the court should have
ruled that the defense would be available pending a determination in federal court of whether there was actually a
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violation of the antitrust laws.
By not staying the action, and by awarding Keene
corporation the full $67,674.16 plus costs and attorney's
fees, the lower court was in a sense a party to the alleged
illegal price fixing scheme of Keene.

If it is shown in the

federal antitrust action currently pending that Keene was
guilty of unlawfully fixing prices, then the lower court
here will obviously be a party to that scheme by enforcing a
contract for the illegally inflated price.
All of the commentators writing directly on the

s~bject

agree that the most ·important considerations in determining
whether or not to allow a defense of antitrust violation in
a contract action are prevention of unjust enrichment and
not allowing a court to enforce illegal agreements.
Note, 30

u.

See:

of Miami L. Rev. 1053 (1976), supra; Sobel,

Antitrust Defenses to Contract Actions:

A Question of Policy

Priorities, 16 Antitrust Bull. 455 (1971); Comment, The Defense of Antitrust Illegality in Contract Actions, 27 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 758, 766 (1960); Note, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term,

73 Harv. L. Rev. 126, 203-206 (1959); Lockhart, Violation of
~ti-Trust Laws as a Defense in Civil Actions, 31 Minn.

L. Rev. 507, note 85 at 523 (1947).

These writers generally

agree that the best solution to this type of problem in a
case involving goods sold and delivered, is to void the
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contract and allow some type of quantum meruit recovery
based on the value of the goods.
Both of the important policy objections could have
been realized by granting a stay, which appellant moved fM
November 9, 1977, pending a determination of whether Keene
violated the antitrust laws.

If it is found in the

Feder~

court action that the contract with Keene did violate the
antitrust laws then Keene should only be allowed to recover
the $40,000 representing the value of the grating
sold.

materia~

An award of any greater amount would be unjust

enrichment for

Keen~,

and would make the court a party to

the unlawful scheme.
Since antitrust violations are not cognizable in state
courts (15

u.s.c.

S15;

~also,

Sobel, 16 Antitrust Bull.

455, 468-475, supra), the only proper course of action wou!C
have been a stay pending a resolution of the Federal action.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT'S MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
STATING THAT EQUITY WILL NOT STOP A CORPORATION DEALING WITH ANOTHER ON A
FRIENDSHIP BASIS FROM BENEFITING BY ITS
BREACH OF MORAL TRUST, AND DECLARING THAT
THERE WAS NO LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE PARTIES, IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND
CONTRARY TO THE JUDGMENT AWARDING KEENE
CORPORATION $66,674.16.
In its Memorandum of Decision dated January 12, 1978,
the lower court stated:
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7.
The problem which has caused the Court
to study the issues in this case at length might
be stated as follows:
"When the executives of two
corporations deal with one another on a friendship
basis, with no legal relationship between them,
but in a close human personal trusting relationship, and one does not make a full disclosure but
takes a limited advantage of the relationship,
will equity step in and stop that corporation
from benefiting by breach of moral trust?" The
Court concludes that the law of sales and the
statutes involved require the answer to be "no".
(Record, pp. 191-92; emphasis added).
This statement raises two important questions:
A.

Should one party to a contract or agreement be al-

lowed to benefit by its own breach of moral trust?
B.

Was the relationship between Keene Corporation and

Grating, Inc. a legal relationship or was it based on friendship alone?
A.

Should One Party To A Contract Or Agreement
Be Allowed To Benefit By Its Own Breach Of
Moral Trust?

Utah Code Annotated §70A-1-203 provides:
tract or duty within this act [Commercial Code]

"Every conimposes an

obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."
"Good faith" is defined in Utah Code Annotated §70A-1-201(19)
as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned".
The testimony at trial and the court Memorandum Opinion
shows that certain officers of Keene repeatedly assured
Officers of Grating, Inc. that the price at which Keene was
Hlling grating products was competitive.

(See Transcript,
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pp. 15-19, 21-24, 75-79, 127-133, 160, 150-151).

The

officers of Keene also told those of Grating, Inc. not

~

bother shopping around for lower prices, since no other
manufacturer could offer them a better price.
pp. 15-19).

(Transcri~,

The testimony and evidence also show very

clearly that Keene's prices were not in fact at all

com~t~

tive, and Grating, Inc. had been deliberately deceived
along.

~l

(Transcript, pp. 45-47, SO, 130-131, 155, 161).

In paragraph 7 of its Memorandum of Decision, quoted
above, the court finds that Keene did not make a full
disclosure to Grating, Inc., breached a moral trust, and
took advantage of the relationship between the two corpora·
tions.

This is not "honesty in fact", and is a clear

breach of the statutory obligation of good faith in the
performance of a contract or other duty.
The lower court should not have allowed Keene to recove1
on a contract which it has admittedly breached.

At the most,

Keene should have been awarded a quantum meru it recovery for
the actual value of the goods, which was agreed to be
$40 ,000.

To allow Keene to recover the full contract price

when it acted with admittedly bad faith would be inequitable
and would encourage bad faith performance in the future.
B.

Was The Relationship Between Keene Corporation
And Grating, Inc. A Legal Relationship Or was
It Based On Friendship Alone?

The lower court's classification of the relationship
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between Keene and Grating as one based on friendship and a
close human personal trust, rather than as a legal relationship, raises a rather interesting paradox.
If the relationship was a legal one based on contract,
then Keene should not be allowed to recover on the contract
because of its breach of the obligation of good faith as
already discussed.
On the other hand, if the relationship was based solely
on friendship with no legal obligations incurred by either
party, then Keene should not be allowed to come into court
claiming breach of a contract and seeking damages.

'If Keene

had only a moral obligation with
Grating, then Grating had only a reciprocal moral obligation
to pay the reasonable value of the goods sold and delivered.
The apparent paradox created by the lower court's classification of the relationship as purely moral can be easily
resolved.

If it is determined that a legal relationship

existed between Keene and Grating, then Keene's recovery
would be limited to the reasonable value of the goods sold
and delivered because of its breach of the statutory obligation of good faith.

On the other hand, if the relationship

is determined to be non-legal, but moral and personal, then
Keene should not be allowed to recover the contract price of
goods sold and delivered, since it is elementary law that
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between Keene and Grating as one based on friendship and a
close human personal trust, rather than as a legal

relat~~

ship, raises a rather interesting paradox.
If the relationship was a legal one based on contract,
then Keene should not be allowed to recover on the contract
because of its breach of the obligation of good faith as
already discussed.
On the other hand, if the relationship was based

so~~

on friendship with no legal obligations incurred by either
party, then Keene should not be allowed to come into court
claiming breach of a contract and seeking damages.

If Keene

had only a moral obligation with
Grating, then Grating had only a reciprocal moral obligation
to pay the reasonable value of the goods sold and delivered.
The apparent paradox created by the lower court's class1·
fication of the relationship as purely moral can be easily
resolved.

If it is determined that a legal relationship

existed between Keene and Grating, then Keene's recovery
would be limited to the reasonable value of the goods sold
and delivered because of its breach of the statutory obliga·
tion of good faith.

On the other hand, if the relationsh~

is determined to be non-legal, but moral and personal, then
Keene should not be allowed to recover the contract price of
goods sold and delivered, since it is elementary law that
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Twenty, Twenty-Three, Twenty-Four, Twenty-Five, Twenty-Six,
Twenty-Eight, Twenty-Nine and Thirty and not supported by
either the Record of the court's Memorandum Opinion.
It is evident from an examination of the Findings of
Fact filed on January 24, 1977 that Keene is attempting to
go beyond the issues in this case and assert Findings of
Fact that may be favorable in the federal antitrust case
regardless of whether the specific findings are supported by
the evidence in this case.
The court erred in not amending these findings in a
manner consistent with its opinion and the Record as requested by the Taylors' Motion to Alter or Amend.
CONCLUSION
This case is not a simple action for the purchase price
of goods sold and delivered.

A highly complex dimension is

added to this case by the fact that a highly complex price
fixing scheme is inextricably intertwined with contracts for
the purchase of goods from Keene by Grating, Inc.
Although the law is unclear as to what type of antitrust
violations can be asserted as a defense to a contract action
it is clear that in a proper case such violations can be
asserted as a defense.
In this case, having entered an Order for Partial
Summary Judgment for the fair value of the goods received by
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Grating thus preventing any possibility of unjust

enrich~m

by Grating, Inc., the court erred in refusing to stay the
action pending the outcome of federal antitrust action and
in striking the Taylors defense based on these violations as
not being available as a matter of law.
Further the court clearly erred in its conclusion

th~

the law of sales will not prevent a party to a contract

fr~

benefiting from its own breach of moral trust.
Consequently, this court shuld reverse the District
Court's Order of October 25, 1977 striking the defenses basei
upon antitrust violations, reverse the Judgment together
with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated Januacy
24, 1978; reverse the Judgment together with Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law dated March 17, 1978 and reverse
the Order dated March 17, 1978.
Further this court should remand the case to the
District Court with instructions to stay all proceedings,
including any proceedings to collect the Partial Summary
Judgment for $40,000, until the completion of the federal
antitrust action.
DATED this

'J.s;;;

day of July, 1978.
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